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Abstract: 
Recent models with liquidity constraints and impatience emphasize that consumers use 
savings to buffer income fluctuations. When wealth is below an optimal target, consumers 
try to increase their buffer stock of wealth by saving more. When it is above target, they 
increase consumption. This important implication of the buffer stock model of saving has 
not been subject to direct empirical testing. We derive from the model an appropriate 
theoretical restriction and test it using data on working-age individuals drawn from the 
2002 and 2004 Italian Surveys of Household Income and Wealth. One of the most 
appealing features of the survey is that it has data on the amount of wealth held for 
precautionary purposes, which we interpret as target wealth in a buffer stock model. The 
test results do not support buffer stock behavior, even among population groups that are 
more likely, a priori, to display such behavior. The saving behavior of young households 
is instead consistent with models in which impatience, relative to prudence, is not as high 
as in buffer stock models. 
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Recent intertemporal consumption models emphasize the role of savings as a
buﬀer stock against income ﬂuctuations. Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) have
solved sophisticated versions of such models. Although the speciﬁc details of the
models diﬀer, emphasizing liquidity constraints or the probability of low income
realizations, they share similar predictions. In both models, consumers have a
unique and stable ratio between cash-on-hand (wealth plus disposable income)
and the permanent component of income, which we term the “target wealth to
permanent income ratio”. As stated by Carroll (1997), buﬀer-stock savers have
a target wealth to permanent income ratio “such that if [actual] wealth is below
the target, the precautionary saving motive will dominate impatience, and the
consumer will save, while if [actual] wealth is above the target, impatience will
dominate prudence, and the consumer will dissave” (p. 2).
This key implication of the buﬀer-stock saving model has not been subject
to empirical scrutiny. Current evidence of buﬀer-stock behavior is based on two
model’s implications: that consumption tracks income closely, and that precau-
tionary saving represents an important reason for wealth accumulation. Several
simulations of intertemporal consumption models predict consumption-income
tracking in the early part of the life-cycle (Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and We-
ber, 1999; Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, 1998; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002;
Cagetti, 2003). Empirical evidence on the importance of precautionary saving
is mostly based on reduced form regressions of net worth or ﬁnancial assets on
proxies for income risk. Some studies report that precautionary wealth represents
a small portion of total wealth, e.g. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992), and
Hurst, Kennickel, Lusardi and Torralba (2005); others ﬁnd a large impact of in-
come risk, Carroll and Samwick (1997), and Gruber and Yelowitz (1999). These
studies diﬀer in many respects, such as the deﬁnition of wealth, the measure of
risk, and institutional features. But even ﬁndings of large eﬀects of income risk
on saving are not conclusive evidence of buﬀer stock behavior, because life-cycle
2models with income risk also provide an important role for precautionary saving,
see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995). In short, the literature still lacks a
convincing test of the buﬀer-stock model.
In this paper we use a survey question on precautionary wealth available
in the 2002 and 2004 Bank of Italy Surveys on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) to propose a direct test of buﬀer stock behavior. The question asks peo-
ple how much savings they think they need for future emergencies, and is similar
to a question contained in the 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances de-
scribed in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004). We interpret this question as providing
information on target wealth in a buﬀer-stock model, and test the proposition
that people with a ratio of actual wealth to permanent income below the target
intend to save, while those with a ratio above target intend to dissave.
Although we focus on Carroll’s version of the buﬀer stock model, the test
applies equally well to Deaton’s case. In Carroll, buﬀer stock behavior emerges
from the tension between impatience, prudence, and the chance of zero earnings.
Impatient individuals would like to anticipate consumption, but the chance of
zero future earnings generates a demand for wealth. In Deaton, there is an
explicit liquidity constraint, but the insights are similar, and buﬀer stock behavior
emerges again as the optimal policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives our test of
the buﬀer stock model, and evaluates it with simulated data. The test can be
used to check whether or not buﬀer stock behavior is rejected by the data, and
relies on a speciﬁc survey question on precautionary wealth. Section 3 describes
such question, and compares it with a similar question asked in the US Survey
of Consumer Finances. The test results, presented in Section 4, are inconsis-
tent with the buﬀer stock model. In Section 5 we therefore present estimates
of the age-wealth proﬁle obtained with Italian repeated cross-sectional data to
provide further evidence on the validity of the buﬀer-stock model. In particu-
lar, the model suggests that the ratio of wealth to permanent income of young
3consumers should be stationary, while models in which prudence dominates im-
patience suggest that the ratio grows even in young ages because consumers save
for retirement. Also this evidence runs contrary to the predictions of the buﬀer
stock model. Section 6 summarizes our ﬁndings.
2 Deriving testable implications of buﬀer stock be-
havior
We take as our point of departure Carroll’s (1997) buﬀer-stock saving model
to derive testable predictions and explain our empirical strategy. Consumers
have ﬁnite horizons and choose consumption to maximize the following objective
function:
E0
T X
t=0
βtu(Ct)
where β is the subjective discount factor, the instantaneous utility function is
isoelastic, u(Ct) = C
1−ρ
t /(1 − ρ), and ρ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion. The dynamic budget constraint is:
Wt+1 = R[Wt − Ct + Yt]
where R = 1 + r is the constant interest rate factor, and Wt, Yt, and Ct are,
respectively, non-human wealth, labor income, and consumption at time t. La-
bor income shifts due to transitory and permanent shocks, assumed to be log-
normally distributed, i.e.,
Yt+1 = Pt+1Vt+1 (1)
Pt+1 = GPtNt+1 (2)
4where G is the growth rate of income, Pt+1 is permanent income, and Vt+1 and
Nt+1 are i.i.d. shocks with mean equal to 1.1 The model also assumes that in
each period there is a small chance p > 0 that transitory income is zero. The
Bellman equation of the problem is:
Vt(Wt,Pt) = max
Ct
{u(Ct) + βEtVt+1(Wt+1,Pt+1)} (3)
s.t. Pt+1 = GPtNt+1
Wt+1 = R[Wt − Ct + Yt]
To exploit the homogeneity of the instantaneous utility function, let’s deﬁne
cash-on-hand Xt as the sum of non-human wealth and income (Xt = Wt + Yt),
and write (3) as:
vt(xt) = max
ct
{u(ct) + βEtG1−ρN
1−ρ
t+1 vt+1(xt+1)} (4)
s.t.
xt+1 = R[xt − ct]
1
GNt+1
+ Vt+1 (5)
where ct = Ct/Pt, vt(xt) = Vt(Wt,Yt)/P
1−ρ
t , and xt = (Wt + Yt)/Pt is what we
call, for brevity, “wealth to permanent income ratio”.2
Carroll (2004) shows that for speciﬁc ranges of parameter values, the problem
has a solution (i.e., the functional deﬁned in (4) has a ﬁxed point), optimal
consumption is an increasing and concave function of cash-on-hand, and the
marginal propensity to consume out of cash-on-hand is bounded from above and
from below. Furthermore, there exists a unique and stable value of x (which
we call x∗ and term, again for brevity, “target wealth to permanent income
1More precisely, Pt+1 is the permanent component of income. We use the two terms inter-
changeably.
2This is to avoid the rather cumbersome terminology of “ratio of cash-on-hand to the
permanent component of income”.
5ratio”) such that, “if actual wealth is greater than the target, impatience will
outweigh prudence, and wealth will fall, while if wealth is below the target, the
precautionary saving motive will outweigh impatience and the consumer will
try to build wealth back up toward to target” (Carroll, 2001, p. 33).3 In our
notation, if (xt −x∗) < 0, then xt grows in expectation. If instead (xt −x∗) > 0,
xt falls (again, in expectation). Using cross-section data, we construct a test of
the theory based on this crucial insight.
At any given point in time, households diﬀer in their value of the wealth
gap (xt − x∗). A ﬁrst source of heterogeneity concerns preferences and the pa-
rameters of the income generating process, which set diﬀerent values of x∗ for
each individual. Income shocks are a second source of heterogeneity: even if two
identical consumers have the same preferences and the same income generating
process - and therefore the same x∗ - they receive diﬀerent income shocks and
have therefore diﬀerent xt and wealth gaps.4
Thus in a cross-section, the model implies that:
COV (xht − x∗
h,Eht(xht+1 − xht)) < 0 (6)
where COV (.,.) is a population covariance and h is a household index. This no-
tation makes explicit that Eht(xht+1−xht) is the time t expectation of household
h’s next period change in the wealth-permanent income ratio, and the covariance
is taken with respect to the cross-sectional distribution of the wealth gap and of
expected asset accumulation.
To use (6) as a basis for an empirical test, one needs to observe x∗
h, xht and
Eht(xht+1). As we shall see, we have data on actual wealth and on a proxy
of target wealth, but not on the expected value of the change in the wealth-
permanent income ratio xht. To evaluate Eht(xt+1), let’s take the expectation as
3Carroll (2004) shows also that, at the target, expected consumption growth is less than
expected permanent income growth; and that expected consumption growth is declining in
cash-on-hand.
4These are not the only possible sources of heterogeneity. In Section 2.2 we use simulation
analysis to explore the eﬀect of heterogeneity in income risk, income growth, and interest rates.
6of time t of (5) for household h, and recall that Eht(Nt+1) = 1, Eht(Vt+1) = 1,
and V ARht(lnNt+1) = σ2
N:
Eht (xht+1) = R[xht − cht] × Eht

1
GNt+1

+ EhtVht+1
≈
R
G
[xht − cht] × eσ2
N + 1 (7)
where the second equality follows from a second order Taylor expansion of
1
Nht+1around the mean of Nht+1.
Substituting (7) in (6) and deﬁning γ = eσ2
N, we can restate (6) in terms of
observable variables as:
θ =
COV (xht − x∗
h,cht)
COV (xht − x∗
h,xht)
>

1−
G
Rγ

(8)
The sign of θ (which from now on we term the “covariance ratio”) is a priori
ambiguous. In fact, σN > 0 implies γ > 1. If the growth rate of income is
lower than the interest rate (G < R) the covariance ratio is a positive number.
However, if G > R the covariance ratio must exceed a negative number, and so it
might itself be negative. In the buﬀer stock model both cases might arise. Indeed,
Carroll (1997) shows that the parameters must satisfy the following inequality:
r − δ
ρ
+
ρ
2
σ2
N < g −
1
2
σ2
N (9)
where lnR ≈ r, lnβ ≈ −δ, and lnG ≈ g.
2.1 Test interpretation and implementation
Our test strategy is as follows. First note that the sample analog of the left-
hand-side of the inequality (8) is:
b θ =
cov(xh − x∗
h,ch)
cov(xh − x∗
h,xh)
=
PH
h=1((xh − x∗
h) −
 
xh − x∗
h

)(ch − ch)
PH
h=1(
 
xh − x∗
h

−
 
xh − x∗
h

)(xh − xh)
7where we have dropped the time subscripts, cov(.,.) is a sample covariance, and
a bar over a variable denotes its cross-sectional mean. This is simply the Instru-
mental Variables (IV) estimate of a regression of ch on xh using the wealth gap
(xh − x∗
h) as an instrument. The advantage of the regression framework is that it
naturally delivers standard errors which allow us to conduct statistical inference
on the value of θ.
There are two ways to test the implications of the buﬀer-stock model under-
lying (8) (and hence (6)). One way would be to choose values of G,R, and γ
and test whether b θ satisﬁes the bound restriction implied by (8). The problem
with this strategy is that the bound restriction may be satisﬁed for implausible
values of the parameters. Instead, our test strategy is based on the comparison
between the empirical and theoretical values of θ. Since we don’t know the true
parameters, we simulate the buﬀer-stock model for a variety of plausible param-
eter conﬁgurations. In particular, we explore cases in which G < R, as well as
cases in which individuals expect high earnings growth relative to the interest
rate (G > R). Finally, we compare the estimated with the simulated covariance
ratio.
2.2 The simulated covariance ratio
To implement our test, we start by simulating the model for an economy popu-
lated by heterogeneous consumers. In the baseline scenario, we posit two sources
of heterogeneity. Each individual has a diﬀerent discount factor, uniformly dis-
tributed between 0.86 and 0.96. This guarantees that each consumer has diﬀerent
target wealth. Secondly, although in the baseline scenario the income process is
the same, in each period consumers are hit by diﬀerent realizations of the shocks.
We set the other models’ parameters following Carroll (2004): the growth
factor G = 1.03, the interest rate factor R = 1.04, the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion ρ = 2, the standard deviation of permanent and transitory income
shocks σN = σV = 0.1, and the probability of unemployment p = 0.005. Such
8parametrization satisﬁes equation (9) and guarantees a stationary target wealth
to permanent income ratio x∗.
We assume that consumers start with zero wealth, and simulate the model
for 100 periods and 1,000 consumers. We then compute, for each consumer, the
target wealth to permanent income ratio such that Eht (xht+1) = xht. In Figure 1
we plot the cross-sectional distribution of target wealth against the intertemporal
discount rate β for the 1,000 buﬀer stock consumers of our simulations. The ﬁgure
highlights the positive association between the discount factor and the target
wealth to permanent income ratio: x
∗
h increases from about 1.2 for β = 0.86 to
1.45 for β = 0.96.
Based on the diﬀerent values of x
∗
h and diﬀerent realizations of xht and cht,
we compute in each of the 100 periods the cross-sectional covariance ratios, and
summarize its distribution by the median value. For the baseline experiment we
ﬁnd a simulated θ = 0.62.5
It is important to check that the simulated θ does not depend heavily on
the speciﬁc parametrization of the model. Therefore we simulate the covariance
ratio under a wide range of alternative, realistic parameter assumptions. Table 1
reports the simulated θ for diﬀerent parameter values and sources of individual
heterogeneity, separately for the case G < R (Panel A) and G > R (Panel B).
Each parametrization satisﬁes the condition (9), and is obtained from the baseline
case by varying one parameter at the time.
Panel A shows that changing the growth factor to 1.025 or 1.035, and the
interest factor to 1.035 or 1.045 does not aﬀect the covariance ratio appreciably,
while raising the coeﬃcient of risk aversion to 4 reduces θ to 0.45. Changing
the income process has a larger impact on the ratio. For instance, lowering the
standard deviation of permanent or transitory income shocks to 0.04 raises the
covariance ratio to 0.66 and 0.69, respectively. Finally, the simulated θ increases
to 0.70 when the probability of unemployment is lowered to 0.1%. In all cases,
5The 25th and 75th percentiles of the simulated covariance ratio are 0.61 and 0.63, respec-
tively.
9the simulated θ ranges from 0.45 to 0.7.
In Panel A we also compute the simulated covariance ratio under diﬀerent
assumptions about the source of heterogeneity in the model. We consider cases
in which the growth factors are uniformly distributed between 1.025 and 1.035
(obtaining θ = 0.63), interest factors between 1.035 and 1.045 (θ = 0.62), coeﬃ-
cients of relative risk aversion between 1.5 and 4 (θ = 0.51), standard deviations
of permanent and transitory income shocks between 4% and 14% (θ = 0.56 and
θ = 0.60, respectively), and probabilities of zero income between 0.1% and 1%
(θ = 0.59).
We then we repeat the simulations considering cases with G > R. In the
baseline scenario we set G = 1.04 and R = 1.03; the other parameters are the
same as in the baseline scenario with G < R (ρ = 2, σN = σV = 0.1, p = 0.005).
The simulated covariance ratio in this case is equal to 0.66. In Panel B we consider
the same sources of heterogeneity as in Panel A. Each of the experiments assumes
G > R, and satisﬁes the condition (9). The simulated covariance ratios range
from 0.48 to 0.76.
Finally, we compute θ choosing parameter values that ﬁt the Italian economy.
In the past two decade the productivity growth rates of Italian workers in the
age group (20-50) has been 1.5%, and the real interest rate 2.5%; accordingly,
we set G = 1.015 and R = 1.025. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) estimate the
income process (1)-(2) with Italian panel data and ﬁnd standard deviations of
permanent and transitory income shocks of 0.16 and 0.28, respectively. For such
parameterization, θ equals 0.46.
We conclude from these experiments that in realistically calibrated buﬀer
stock models the covariance ratio is likely to be in the 0.5−0.6 range, and unlikely
to fall below 0.4 or to exceed 0.8. Any empirical estimate of θ that is statistically
signiﬁcantly away from this range would therefore be hard to reconcile with buﬀer
stock behavior.
103 Data
To implement the empirical test of the buﬀer stock model, we use the 2002 and
2004 Italian Surveys of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). SHIW is a bian-
nual representative sample of the Italian population conducted by the Bank of
Italy.6 In each year, the sample includes about 8,000 households and 24,000 indi-
viduals. Details on questionnaire, sample design, response rates, results and com-
parison of survey data with macroeconomic data are given in Biancotti, D’Alessio,
Faiella and Neri (2004) and Faiella, Gambacorta, Iezzi and Neri (2006).7
For our purposes, the SHIW has several advantages. It has data on wealth, in-
come, consumption, and detailed demographic characteristics of the household.
Net ﬁnancial assets measure the liquid portion of wealth, and are the sum of
transaction accounts, government bonds, CDs, corporate bonds, retirement ac-
counts, life insurance, and stocks, less household debt (mortgage loans, consumer
credit and other personal loans). Total assets are the sum of net ﬁnancial assets
and real assets (real estate, unincorporated business holdings, valuables and art
objects). The SHIW also includes a rotating panel component: in each year,
about 45% of the households are also interviewed two years later. We will later
use the panel section of the SHIW to recover individual-level variables available
only in the 2000 survey and to assess the robustness of our results in the presence
of ﬁxed eﬀects.
Most importantly for the present study, the 2002 and 2004 SHIW have a
direct question on precautionary wealth, which we use to proxy target wealth
in the buﬀer stock model: “People save in various ways (depositing money in a
6In the buﬀer stock model, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is high because con-
sumers are impatient. Carroll (2001) interprets the excess sensitivity of consumption found by
Campbell and Mankiw (1991) and Jappelli and Pagano (1989) in time series data for several
OECD countries, and in Italy in particular, as dependent on the prevalence of impatient house-
holds. He argues that in these countries there are “more households who are impatient and
consequently inhabit the portion of the consumption function where the MPC is high, whether
they are formally constrained or not” (Carroll, 2001). Italy, therefore, provides a good testing
ground for the buﬀer-stock model.
7The SHIW started in 1977, but data on consumption have been collected only since 1984.
11bank account, buying ﬁnancial assets, property, or other assets) and for diﬀerent
reasons. A ﬁrst reason is to prepare for a planned event, such as the purchase of
a house, children’s education, etc. Another reason is to protect against contin-
gencies, such as uncertainty about future earnings or unexpected outlays (owing
to health problems or other emergencies). About how much do you think you
and your family need to have in savings to meet such unexpected events?” The
question is patterned after a similar question in the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), described in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004).8
Table 2 reports sample means and quartiles of target wealth for various sample
groups, pooling data for 2002 and 2004. The median value of target wealth is
25,000 euro, while the mean is 55,137. Interestingly, these values are considerably
higher than in the U.S., where Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) report that the bulk
of the distribution of target wealth is between $5,000 and $10,000. Target wealth
is higher among high-school and college graduates, self-employed, households
with multiple income recipients, and households living in the North.
The median ratio of target wealth to total wealth is 0.31, and 3.32 if wealth
includes only ﬁnancial assets. These numbers are higher than in Kennickell and
Lusardi (2004), who report 0.08 and 0.2 respectively. This shows that in Italy
precautionary wealth potentially accounts for a larger portion of wealth, possi-
bly due to higher income risk and/or lower degree of development of ﬁnancial
and insurance markets. The Italian data also indicate that in 75% of the cases
ﬁnancial wealth is below target, and in 28% of cases total wealth is below tar-
get. Comparable ﬁgures for Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) are 48% and 17%,
respectively.
8The SCF question is: “About how much do you think you and your family need to have in
savings for unanticipated emergencies and other unexpected things that may come up?” The
question has been extensively tested in the SCF with focus groups. Nevertheless, the question
may be criticized because some consumers might report what they wish to save rather than
what they aim to save, and because some may act “as if” they behave according to a buﬀer
stock model, even though they have diﬃculty identifying what their target wealth-income ratio
is. Since there are no objective measures of target wealth, we cannot check whether these
criticisms are founded.
12In the empirical application we measure consumption as non durable ex-
penditures.9 We deﬁne cash-on-hand as Y + Wf + λWr, where Y is household
disposable income, Wf and Wr are, respectively, net ﬁnancial assets and real
assets, and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 measures the portion of real assets that can be used in
the current period to ﬁnance consumption.10 We focus on a sample where buﬀer
stock behavior is more likely to emerge, selecting households with heads aged
between 20 and 50. The resulting sample consists of 5,911 observations (2,953
for 2002 and 2,958 for 2004).
Consumption, target wealth, cash-on-hand and the wealth gap are all nor-
malized by an estimate of the permanent component of income, that is, income
during the working life purged from transitory components. We opt for a simple
and straightforward deﬁnition, and estimate the permanent component of income
by the ﬁtted value of a regression of household non-ﬁnancial income on age, ed-
ucation, dummies for occupation, region of residence, head gender, number of
earners, and a year dummy.
Figure 2 plots the histogram of the target wealth to permanent income ratio.
The median ratio represents slightly more than one year of income, and the bulk
of the distribution is between 2 months and six years. Figure 3 reports the
density of the ratio splitting the sample by business ownership and number of
income recipients. The ﬁgure shows that the distribution of the ratio is higher
for business owners and single income households, which should indeed be the
case if these households face more uncertainty relative to the other groups.
Table 3 reports median regressions for the logarithm of target wealth, and
for the target wealth to permanent income ratio. In each case we control for the
log of permanent income. Since regional factors are quite important in Italy, and
might be correlated with background economic variables and preferences, we run
the two speciﬁcations including a full set of 20 regional dummies. The coeﬃcient
9Results are unchanged if one deﬁnes consumption as the sum of non durable and durable
expenditures, see Section 4.6.
10Another reason to let λ vary is that the deﬁnition of cash-on-hand adds a ﬂow (income) to
a stock (wealth).
13estimates show that target wealth increases with age (slightly less than 1% for
each year) and education (between 2% and 3% per year). Business owners have a
target wealth that is about 20% higher than the reference group, conﬁrming the
graphical comparison in Figure 3. Single income households have a target wealth
that is about 10% higher, although the coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent
from zero when we control for regional eﬀects.
4 Testing the buﬀer stock model
In this section we estimate the covariance ratio θ and compare it with the simu-
lated values from Section 2.2. Recall that the simulated θ never falls below 0.4 or
exceeds 0.8. In this section we also test if θ diﬀers by economic and demographic
characteristics of the household. We focus on households facing high income
risk (such as business owners, single income households, the self-employed) and
impatient consumers (using a direct survey question on the rate of time prefer-
ence). Finally, we check robustness of our results to measurement error, diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of income and consumption, and unobserved heterogeneity.
4.1 Baseline estimates
The ﬁrst row of Table 4 displays baseline estimates for the whole sample on the
pooled 2002-2004 sample. They are obtained regressing consumption on cash-
on-hand, using the wealth gap as an instrument. All variables are divided by
our estimate of the permanent component of income. In the ﬁrst column, we set
λ = 1 and cash-on-hand is just Y +Wf +Wr, on the assumption that households
can use all assets to buﬀer income shocks. The point estimate of θ is 0.012, much
lower than the values consistent with buﬀer stock behavior. Since the estimate
has a small standard error, we formally reject the hypothesis that θ equals any
one of the simulated values of Table 2. Setting λ = {0.75,0.50,0.25}, we ﬁnd
that b θ ranges from 0.015 to 0.017, much below the range of admissible values of
14the simulated ratio.
4.2 Group estimates
Even if our baseline results do not support it, the buﬀer-stock model might still
characterize the behavior of some population groups that face high income volatil-
ity or are more impatient. We are particularly interested in detecting buﬀer-stock
behavior for groups that, a priori or based on previous evidence, are more likely
to exhibit such behavior. The self-employed clearly face greater income risk than
employees. If the incomes of households with multiple earners are not perfectly
correlated, single income households face more risk than households where both
spouses work. The young might face more income uncertainty, or be more impa-
tient than the middle-aged because do not yet perceive the need to accumulate
for old age. In Italian regions with better functioning credit and insurance mar-
kets (the North and the Centre), employment shocks and other risks are more
likely to be insured. And in the case of education, we have hard evidence with
the same dataset that income risk diﬀers by level of education.
To check if buﬀer stock behavior characterizes some population groups, in Ta-
ble 4 we present estimates of θ splitting the sample by age (less than 30, between
30 and 40, between 40 and 50), number of income earners, employment status,
business ownership, and region of residence. In the ﬁrst column b θ never exceeds
0.02, conﬁrming the full sample estimates for each of the group considered. The
b θ are precisely estimated, and in each case we reject the hypothesis that they
are consistent with the simulated covariance ratio. The estimates for diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of cash-on-hand do not change the pattern of results.
Recent work on the extent of precautionary motive for saving has focussed on
business owners. Business owners and entrepreneurs face higher income risk, but
their wealth holdings are also higher than average. Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell,
and Torralba (2005) provide evidence that tests of precautionary saving are con-
siderably aﬀected by the treatment of entrepreneurs. In the total sample, they
15ﬁnd a strong, positive relation between wealth and permanent income shocks, as
in Carroll and Samwick (1987). But the result is almost entirely due to busi-
ness owners: when these are excluded from the sample, there is hardly evidence
for precautionary saving. Table 4 reports b θ distinguishing by entrepreneurship,
deﬁned as positive business wealth. The results are again at variance with the
buﬀer stock model for both groups. We also ﬁnd a lower value of b θ in the group
with lower education, but the point estimates are again far away from the simu-
lated values. Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of cash-on-hand do not change appreciably the
pattern of results for each of the sample splits considered.
4.3 Impatience
The rate of time preference is a critical parameter of models of intertemporal
choice, but microeconomic data seldom allow to pin down particular features of
this and other preference parameters. The 2000 SHIW attempts at providing
data on time preference through a lottery question. Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O’Donoghue (2002) survey theoretical and empirical research on time preferences,
and classify the various methods by elicitation methodology (choice, matching,
rating or pricing), type of instrument used to elicit preferences (ﬁeld versus ex-
periment), and time frame (less than one day to many years). They report that a
widely used way to elicit the rate of time preference is through survey questions
asking the respondent to report how much he or she is willing the pay to receive
a lottery winnings today instead of later in time. The 2000 SHIW has precisely
such question: “Suppose that you win 5,000 euro, payable for certain in a year’s
time. What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay to have the
5,000 euro immediately?”.
The question is asked only to half of the sample (household heads born in
odd-numbered years), and about 15% don’t answer it. The 2000 data can be
merged with 2002 and 2004 data using the panel component of SHIW (1,749
households are interviewed in 2000, 2002 and 2004). After merging the data, and
16considering that we select individuals less than 50 years old in 2002, we are left
with 797 valid observations with data on both target wealth and time preference.
On average, to cash the lottery one year in advance, respondents are willing to
pay 150 euro, implying a quite standard rate of time preference of 3%. Several
studies use questions similar to this, as documented in Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue (2002), who also reviews pros and cons of various methods for
eliciting time preference.11
We therefore split the sample according to whether the rate of time preference
is above or below 3%. Table 5 reports b θ in the two sub-samples. It is important
to keep in mind that in this case we have a limited number of observations. For
λ < 0.75, the b θ for the high impatience group is higher for all measures of cash-
on-hand. However, buﬀer stock behavior is rejected in both groups, as b θ ranges
between 1.1% and 2.5%.
4.4 Panel estimates
In Section 2.1 we stress that the covariance ratio θ can be obtained by the cross-
sectional regression ch = η + θxh + uh. Any valid estimation of such equation
requires instruments that are correlated with x but uncorrelated with c, except
through their eﬀect on x. Indeed, our framework posits that the wealth gap
(xh − x∗
h) provides such instrument. In the buﬀer stock model, the only reasons
why the wealth gap might diﬀer across consumers are the history of household-
speciﬁc shocks, and the parameters determining target wealth (risk aversion,
rate of time preference relative to the interest rate, growth rate of income, and
standard deviation of permanent income shocks).
In practice, however, one cannot rule out that there is some systematic rela-
tionship between the error term in consumption and what people report about
their target wealth. As an example, suppose that some households are patient
11Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) emphasize that measurement of time pref-
erence can be aﬀected by confounding factors, such as uncertainty, intertemporal arbitrage and
consumption smoothing.
17and have larger target wealth than others, and that it takes them longer to reach
their target wealth than impatient consumers. Then during the transition period
following an income shock one would observe that households with large negative
values of the wealth gap (the patient ones) consume less. More generally, any
omitted variable might lead to biased estimates of θ.
To address the potential source of bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity,
we can rely on the panel section of the SHIW. A total of 4,408 households were
interviewed in 2002 and 2004, providing data on all the relevant variables in two
time periods. Excluding households where the head is older than 50 years, results
in a two-year panel of 1,087 households for a total of 2,174 observations.
The ﬁrst row of Table 6 reports ﬁxed eﬀect IV estimates of ch using (xh − x∗
h)
as instrument for xh . In the total sample b θ = 0.007. This estimate is precisely
estimated and even lower than the cross-sectional estimate. The other cells of
the table report b θ for various deﬁnitions of wealth. Overall, the panel results
suggest that, if any bias exists, it cannot explain rejection of the model obtained
in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the instrument.
Panel data also oﬀer the opportunity to test model predictions that do not
depend on the target wealth variable directly. Under the buﬀer stock model, low
wealth households hit by negative income shocks should save and high wealth
households dissave. Accordingly, we compute median change in cash-on-hand for
poor and rich households. In our sample median saving is positive in both groups
(4,000 and 6,482 euro, respectively).12 Although it is hard to draw inference with
a two-year panel, this represents further evidence against the buﬀer stock model.
4.5 Further sensitivity checks
Our measure of permanent income, which we use to normalize cash-on-hand,
consumption, and target wealth, is obtained through cross-sectional regressions,
and may not be purged from transitory components. In the second row of Ta-
12Poor households have less than 10,000 euro in cash-on-hand, and rich more than 60,000
euro.
18ble 6 we report the estimated covariance ratio using an alternative measure,
obtained averaging household disposable income (net of ﬁnancial income) over
time. Averaging should remove income components that are purely transitory
and mean-reverting. This measure can only be computed for the panel section of
the SHIW. Accordingly, we report estimates using the panel section of the last
three surveys (2000, 2002 and 2004). The drawback is that the number of ob-
servations is considerably reduced and that the evolution of income in the short
time period covered by the panel is a function of shocks that arrived during that
period. In practice, the estimated covariance ratio appears to be very similar.
All our tests have been conducted deﬁning consumption as non-durable ex-
penditure. SHIW has also data on expenditures on durable goods, and therefore
we can use total expenditure as an alternative measure of consumption. As shown
in the last row of Table 6, the results barely change.
4.6 Measurement error
In our baseline estimates of Table 4 we estimate a covariance ratio of 0.012, to
be contrasted with a simulated value of 0.62. Can measurement error account
for such a large diﬀerence between the theoretical benchmark and empirical esti-
mates? To explore the robustness of our ﬁndings in the presence of measurement
error, suppose that consumption, cash-on-hand and target wealth are all mea-
sured with error:
e ch = ch + εc
h
e xh = xh + εx
h
e x∗
h = x∗
h + εx∗
h
where tilded variables are observed, untilded are true, unobserved values, and εk
h
is a measurement error in variable k having mean zero. Under the assumptions
19that the errors are uncorrelated with each other and with true consumption,
cash-on-hand and target wealth, one can show that the probability limit of our
IV estimator of θ is:
θ(ν,ξ) = plim b θ = θ

1 − ν − ξ
1 − ξ

< θ
where ν is the percent variation in measured cash-on-hand explained by mea-
surement error, and ξ = σe xe x∗/σ2
e x. The expression shows that in the presence
of measurement error our estimator can be indeed downward biased. Thus, one
could reject the buﬀer stock model even when the model is true, at least in
principle.
To establish how large should measurement error be in order to reconcile
our results with the buﬀer stock model, we plot the probability limit of b θ as a
function of ν and compare it with b θ. As long as the probability limit of b θ is larger
than estimated b θ, measurement error cannot account for the model rejection. To
compute the probability limit of b θ we set θ to its baseline simulated value (0.62),
and note that ξ can be obtained as the slope coeﬃcient in the OLS regression of
e x∗
h on e xh, which we ﬁnd to be 0.0349.
In Figure 4 we plot the estimated covariance ratio (the horizontal line b θ =
0.012) and the probability limit of b θ against measurement error ν. The ﬁgure
shows that only for very large values of ν the probability limit of b θ falls below b θ:
that is, measurement error leads to false rejection of the buﬀer stock model only
if ν > 0.95. In other words, only extremely large measurement error in wealth
can possibly make b θ = 0.012 consistent with buﬀer stock behavior. Since the
reliability index of income and wealth in the SHIW exceeds 80%, it is extremely
unlikely that measurement error invalidates our test, regardless of the wealth
deﬁnitions.13
13Biancotti, D’Alessio and Neri (2004) give extensive account of the quality of the main
variables in SHIW. Exploiting the panel section of the survey, they compute the reliability index
for a broad range of variables. The index is the fraction of total variability of the measured
characteristic accounted by its true variability.
205 The wealth-income ratio of young households
The version of the buﬀer stock model that we analyze is one with impatient
consumers, uncertainty about future earnings, and no borrowing constraints. If
such consumers are suﬃciently prudent and expect their earnings to grow over
time, they will never borrow and keep their consumption within their current
incomes, thus inducing “tracking” between consumption and income. In other
versions of the buﬀer stock model, impatient consumers would like to borrow
but are prevented to do so because of credit market imperfections, as in Deaton
(1991). The implications for the behavior of consumption and wealth are similar,
however, and “consumption is smoothed, not over the whole life-cycle, but over
much shorter periods of a few years at a time” (Deaton, 2005). In the literature,
this is often referred to as “high-frequency” smoothing of income, as opposed to
the “low-frequency” or “life-cycle frequency” smoothing that was postulated by
Modigliani and Brumberg (see Browning and Crossley, 2001).
Tracking of income and consumption and buﬀer stock behavior stand in sharp
contrast with one of the most important implications of the Life-Cycle Hypothe-
sis, according to which young people save for post-retirement expenditures, and
accumulate wealth up to retirement. In the certainty version the model, the
wealth to permanent income ratio increases during the working span, target
wealth to permanent income ratio is reached at retirement age, and the con-
sumption and income proﬁles are completely detached. If income is expected to
increase over the working life, consumers borrow early in life, and start accumu-
lating wealth only when debt is repaid, which might be even after several years
of work, depending on preferences and the growth rate of individual incomes
(Hubbard and Judd, 1986).
In a more sophisticated version of the life-cycle model with income risk and life
uncertainty, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) show that suﬃciently patient
consumers save even earlier in life. In these life-cycle models with income risk,
uncertainty generates a demand for precautionary saving during the working
21span. But, as noted by Modigliani (1986), cash-on-hand can serve the double
purpose of providing resources for retirement and a buﬀer against unexpected
emergencies.
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) results fall in between these two polar cases.
They estimate that the behavior of young consumers exhibits buﬀer stock behav-
ior, at least in the U.S. These consumers would like to borrow but cannot, or are
too prudent to borrow. One way or another, their consumption tracks income
closely and the wealth-income ratio is approximately constant. Once consumers
reach middle-age, however, they follow the standard life-cycle model and the
wealth-income ratio increases until retirement. Similar tracking of income and
consumption arises in models with hyperbolic discounting, see Laibson, Repetto
and Tobacman (1998).14 The age proﬁle of the wealth-income ratio of working
age consumers provides therefore a useful avenue to distinguish diﬀerent classes
of models of intertemporal choice.
In the previous section we established that Italian wealth data are at variance
with the buﬀer stock model. Even though we select a sample where buﬀer stock
behavior is most likely to arise (individuals aged 20 to 50, or individuals with
relatively high rates of time preference), we do not ﬁnd evidence that deviations of
wealth from target are oﬀset by changes in consumption. What then explains the
saving decisions of young households? To provide further evidence of the validity
of the buﬀer stock model, we estimate the age proﬁle of the wealth-income ratio
with seven SHIW waves, running from 1989 to 2002 (almost 60,000 households).
To account for the fact that some of the wealth is illiquid and cannot be used for
precautionary purposes, we use two deﬁnitions of x = (Wf +λWr +Y )/P , with
λ = 0 and λ = 1.
We sort the data by the year of birth of the head of the household. The ﬁrst
cohort includes all households whose head was born in 1939 (50 years old in 1989,
14The composition of wealth, however, diﬀers between models with exponential and hyperbolic
discounting, because hyperbolic consumers hold a smaller share of assets in liquid form, see
Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman and Weinberg (2001).
22the year of the ﬁrst survey). The second includes those born in 1940, and so on
up to the last cohort, which includes those born in 1980 (22 years old in 2002,
the last year). As with other survey data, the distribution of x is skewed. We
therefore report only results for the median ratio; results for the 25th and 75th
percentiles exhibit similar patterns.
The left graphs in Figure 5 oﬀers important insights into the process of wealth
accumulation of young Italian households. To make the graphs more readable, we
plot x for selected cohorts. The numbers in the graph refer to the year of birth,
from 50 (individuals born in 1950) to 65 (individuals born in 1965). Except for
the youngest and the oldest generations, each cohort is observed at seven diﬀerent
points in times, one for each cross-section. As said, the cross-sections run from
1989 to 2002. Thus, each generation is observed for 13 years with each line being
broken (for instance, cohort 60 is sampled 7 times from age 29 in 1989 to age 42
in 2002). The x ratio is potentially aﬀected by age, cohort and time eﬀects.
To estimate the age proﬁle of x, we use 203 age/year/cohort cells and proceed
as Deaton and Paxson (1994), regressing x on age dummies, cohort dummies,
and restricted year dummies, summing to zero and orthogonal to a time trend.15
Given the structure of our sample, the regressors include 28 age dummies (from
age 22 to age 50), 41 cohort dummies (from 1939 to 1980), a set of restricted time
dummies, and a constant term. The estimated age dummies can be interpreted
as an individual age-wealth proﬁle, purged from cohort eﬀects. They are plotted
on the right-side of Figure 5.
Using the broad deﬁnition of cash-on-hand (λ = 1) , between age 20 and
50 there is a three-fold increase in x (from 2 to 6); using a narrow deﬁnition
(λ = 0), a two-fold increase (from 1.5 to 3). Overall, the graphs suggest that
models in which consumption and income of young households track each other
closely are not an adequate description of the behavior of Italian households.
15An alternative identiﬁcation assumption is to express the ratio as a function of age dummies
and unrestricted time dummies (eliminating cohorts eﬀects). This alternative decomposition
delivers qualitative similar results, e.g. an increasing x during the early part of the life-cycle.
Both normalizations rule out time-age or time-cohort interaction terms.
23Rather, consumers start saving early in life, and accumulate assets at the rate of
around 10% of their income, or 3,000 euro per year.16
6 Conclusions
Intertemporal models with liquidity constraints, income risk, and impatience
emphasize that consumers use savings to buﬀer income ﬂuctuations. These mod-
els deliver a stationary distribution of the ratio of target wealth to permanent
income. When actual wealth, relative to income, is below the optimal target,
consumers try to increase their saving. When wealth is above target, they in-
crease consumption. This important implication of the buﬀer stock model has
not been subject to direct empirical testing.
We derive from the model an appropriate theoretical restriction and test it
using data drawn from the 2002 and 2004 Italian Surveys of Household Income
and Wealth. One of the most appealing features of these surveys is that people
report the amount of wealth held for precautionary purposes, which we interpret
as target wealth in the buﬀer stock model. The test results do not support buﬀer
stock behavior, even among population groups that are more likely, a priori, to
display such behavior (the young and the self-employed). Unobserved hetero-
geneity and measurement error in target wealth or consumption are unlikely to
explain the model’s failure.
Our test rejects the buﬀer stock model, but cannot necessarily be interpreted
as suggesting that alternative consumption theories are valid. In the ﬁnal part
of the paper we therefore use estimates of the age-wealth proﬁle obtained with
Italian repeated cross-sectional data to provide further evidence on the valid-
ity of the buﬀer-stock model. Indeed, the model predicts that for the young
consumption tracks income closely and that the wealth-income ratio is approxi-
16Since wealth accumulation does not depend only on age and cohort, we also experiment
adding to the basic regression household size and composition, a dummy for retirement, educa-
tion, gender, and region of residence. The qualitative results of increasing wealth-income ratio
in Figure 4 is unchanged.
24mately constant. In fact, we ﬁnd that the wealth-income ratio of young Italian
households increases substantially with age.
Overall, the saving behavior of young households in our data is hard to rec-
oncile with models predicting a close parallel between consumption and income,
such as hyperbolic discounting and preference reversal models. The evidence is
instead consistent with models in which impatience, relative to prudence, is not
as high as in buﬀer stock models, and with models where life-cycle considerations
(such as saving for home purchase or for retirement) are of paramount importance
to understand the behaviour of the young.
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27Table 1. The Simulated Covariance Ratio
Panel A: G < R
Growth factor Covariance ratio θ Interest rate factor Covariance ratio θ
G = 1.025 0.605 R =1.035 0.632
G = 1.035 0.641 R =1.045 0.616
G = [1.025, 1.035] 0.629 R= [1.035, 1.045] 0.617
Probability of zero income Relative risk aversion
p= 0.001 0.704 ρ = 1.5 0.669
p= 0.01 0.572 ρ = 4 0.452
p= [0.001,0.01] 0.594 ρ = [1.5, 4] 0.513
S.d. of permanent shocks S.d. of transitory shocks
σN= 0.04 0.663 σV = 0.04 0.691
σN= 0.14 0.524 σV = 0.14 0.586
σN= [0.04,0.14] 0.561 σV = [0.04,0.14] 0.596
Panel B: G > R
Growth factor Covariance ratio θ Interest rate factor Covariance ratio θ
G = 1.035 0.654 R = 1.025 0.669
G = 1.045 0.675 R = 1.035 0.660
G = [1.035, 1.045] 0.672 R = [1.025, 1.035] 0.661
Probability of zero income Relative risk aversion
p = 0.001 0.688 ρ = 1.5 0.716
p = 0.01 0.624 ρ = 4 0.485
p = [0.001,0.01] 0.645 ρ = [1.5, 4] 0.567
S.d. of permanent shocks S.d. of transitory shocks
σN = 0.04 0.731 σV = 0.04 0.757
σN = 0.14 0.625 σV = 0.14 0.615
σN = [0.04,0.14] 0.644 σV = [0.04,0.14] 0.643
Note. The table reports the median simulated covariance ratio under alternative parameteriza-
tion of a buﬀer stock economy populated by 1,000 individuals. In the baseline scenario of Panel
A G = 1.03, R = 1.04, ρ = 2, σN = 0.1, σV = 0.1, and p = 0.005, β ranges from 0.86 to 0.96,
and the median simulated covariance ratio is θ = 0.623. In the baseline scenario of Panel B,
G = 1.04, R = 1.03, ρ = 2, σN = 0.1, σV = 0.1, and p = 0.005, β ranges from 0.86 to 0.96, and
the median simulated covariance ratio is θ = 0.664.
28Table 2. Selected Statistics for Target Wealth
Mean First quartile Median Third quartile Number of
observations
20≤Age≤ 30 47,661 9,429 23,572 47,143 617
30< Age≤ 40 58,531 10,000 25,000 50,000 2,243
40<Age≤ 50 57,022 10,000 28,285 52,000 3,051
Self-employed 69,350 15,000 47,143 94,286 1,078
Employee 51,967 10,000 25,000 50,000 4,833
Single earner 49,864 9,429 23,572 50,000 2,683
Multiple earners 60,302 10,000 28,286 60,000 3,228
North-Center 61,316 11,314 28,286 66,000 3,977
South 40,857 50,000 18,857 47,143 1,934
Entrepreneurs 69,399 14,143 40,000 94,286 1,209
Non-entrepreneurs 51,651 9,429 25,000 50,000 4,702
Low education 48,232 9,429 25,000 50,000 2,665
High education 61,447 10,000 28,286 60,000 3,246
Total sample 55,137 10,000 25,000 50,000 5,911
Note. The table reports sample statistics of target wealth. The sample is obtained pooling
the 2002 and 2004 SHIW. Sample statistics are estimated using population weights. Values are
expressed in 2002 euros.
29Table 3. Regressions for Target Wealth
Log target wealth Target wealth
to permanent income ratio
Age 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.009
(0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.004)** (0.003)***
Years of education 0.023 0.028 0.024 0.030
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Self-employed 0.029 0.047 0.017 0.031
(0.081) (0.080) (0.090) (0.082)
Business owners 0.216 0.210 0.229 0.260
(0.078)*** (0.076)*** (0.086)*** (0.078)***
Family size -0.006 0.050 -0.006 0.050
(0.018) (0.020)** (0.020) (0.020)**
Single income 0.142 0.071 0.171 0.081
(0.058)** (0.058) (0.064)*** (0.059)
Log permanent income 0.645 0.324 -0.367 -0.725
(0.071)*** (0.078)*** (0.078)*** (0.079)***
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes
Note. The table reports median regressions for the log of target wealth and the ratio of target
wealth to permanent income using the pooled 2002-04 SHIW. The second and fourth regressions
include a set of 20 regional dummies. The permanent component of income is estimated by the
ﬁtted value of a regression of household non-ﬁnancial income on age, education, dummies for
occupation, region of residence, head gender and number of earners in the household and year
dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
30Table 4. Estimated Covariance Ratio: Baseline Regression and Group Esti-
mates
Y + λWr + Wf Number of
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.25 observations
Total sample 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.015 5,911
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
20≤Age≤30 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.005 617
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010)
30<Age≤40 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.011 2,243
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
40<Age≤50 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.017 3,051
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Self-employed 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.015 1,078
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Employees 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.017 4,833
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Single earners 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.014 2,683
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Multiple earners 0.012 0.015 0.020 0.023 3,228
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
North-Center 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.023 3,977
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
South 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.008 1,934
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Entrepreneurs 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.015 1,209
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Non-entrepreneurs 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.016 4,702
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Low education 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.009 2,665
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
High education 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.018 3,246
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Note. The sample is based on the pooled 2002 and 2004 SHIW. Wr and Wf are, respectively,
real and ﬁnancial wealth, Y is disposable income, and λ is the share of real assets that can be
used in the current period to ﬁnance consumption. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
31Table 5. Estimated Covariance Ratio: Sample Splits by Rate of Time Prefer-
ence
Y + λWr + Wf Number of
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.25 observations
High impatience 0.011 0.014 0.020 0.025 188
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Low impatience 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.011 609
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Note. The sample slits are based on a question in the 2000 SHIW asking the respondent to
report how much he or she is willing the pay to receive a lottery winnings today instead of later
in time. “High” and “Low impatience” refer to values of the reported rate of time preference
greater or lower than 3%. Observations for 2000 are then merged with data from 2002-04, and
estimation is performed on the resulting pooled data. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and
ﬁnancial wealth, Y is disposable income, and λ is the share of real assets that can be used in
the current period to ﬁnance consumption. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 6. Estimated Covariance Ratio: Sensitivity Checks
Y + λWr + Wf Number of
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.25 observations
IV ﬁxed eﬀect 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 2,174
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Permanent income -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 1,601
(2000-04 average) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Consumption 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.017 5,911
includes durables (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Note. The table reports the estimated covariance ratio obtained, in turn, as ﬁxed eﬀect IV
estimate in the 2002-04 panel; using the 2000-04 panel to estimate permanent income; adopting
the deﬁnition of consumption including durables. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and ﬁnancial
wealth, Y is disposable income, and λ is the share of real assets that can be used in the current
period to ﬁnance consumption. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
32Figure 1. Simulated Target Wealth to Permanent Income Ratio
Note. The ﬁgure plots the target wealth to permanent income ratio (x
∗) as a function of the
discount factor β. The target wealth ratios are obtained simulating the buﬀer stock model with
the baseline parameters G = 1.03, R = 1.04, ρ = 2, σN = 0.1, σV = 0.1, p = 0.005
33Figure 2. Target Wealth to Permanent Income Ratio
Note. The ﬁgure plots the sample distribution of the target wealth to permanent income ratio
in the pooled 2002-04 SHIW.
34Figure 3. Target Wealth to Permanent Income Ratio, by Business Ownership
and Number of Income Recipients
Note. The ﬁgure plots the kernel density of the target wealth to permanent income ratio using
the pooled 2002-04 SHIW by business ownership and number of income recipients.
35Figure 4. The Eﬀect of Measurement Error in the Estimated Covariance Ratio
Note. The dashed line is the estimated covariance ratio (b θ = 0.012) from the total sample
regression in Table 4 with cash-on-hand deﬁned as Y + Wr + Wf. The continuous line is the
probability limit of b θ as function of ν, the percent variation in measured cash-on-hand explained
by measurement error. The probability limit is computed setting θ = 0.623 and ξ = 0.0349.
36Figure 5. The Age Proﬁle of the Median Wealth-Income Ratio
Note. The two graphs on the left report the median wealth-income ratio of selected cohorts using
the 1989-2004 SHIW. We use two deﬁnitions of wealth: the broad deﬁnition is Y +Wr+Wf, and
the narrow deﬁnition is Y +0.25Wr+Wf. The two graphs on the right report the estimated age
proﬁles, obtained by regressions of the wealth-income ratio on age dummies, cohort dummies,
and restricted year dummies summing to zero and orthogonal to a time trend.
37CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2007/28  Annamaria Lusardi  Household Saving Behavior: The Role of Literacy, 
Information and Financial Education Programs 
2007/27  Maarten van Rooij 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Rob J. M. Alessie 
Financial Literacy and Stock Market Participation 
2007/26  Franklin Allen 
Elena Carletti 
Robert Marquez 
Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and 
Firm Value 
2007/25  Nikolaus Hautsch  Capturing Common Components in High-
Frequency Financial Time Series: A Multivariate 
Stochastic Multiplicative Error Model 
2007/24  Christian Offermanns 
Marcus Pramor 
The CFS International Capital Flow Database: A 
User’s Guide 
2007/23  Michael Binder 
Christian Offermanns 
International Investment Positions and Exchange 
Rate Dynamics: A Dynamic Panel Analysis 
2007/22  Howard Kunreuther 
Alexander Muermann 
Self-Protection and Insurance with Inter-
dependencies 
2007/21  Wolfram J. Horneff 
Raimond H. Maurer 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Michael Z. Stamos 
Money in Motion: Dynamic Portfolio Choice in 
Retirement 
2007/20  Bea Canto 
Roman Kräussl 
Electronic Trading Systems and Intraday Non-
Linear Dynamics: An Examination of the FTSE 
100 Cash and Futures Returns 
2007/19  Maria Kasch-Haroutounian 
Erik Theissen 
Competition between Exchanges: Euronext versus 
Xetra 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  